The Simulation Argument: Philosophical and Theological Implications

The Mirror Cosmos: Simulation and Idealism

Sanford L. Drob, Ph.D.

An interesting implication of the idea that we may be living in a simulation is that it results in the paradoxical view that idealism, as opposed to materialism, is a correct philosophical view, or, perhaps more accurately, it suggests a dialectic that leads from the assumptions of materialism to idealism. 

One of the assumptions of a certain form of philosophical materialism is that consciousness and its associated mental states are a function of material events and processes. On one prevailing interpretation of philosophical materialism and naturalism, mental states and consciousness are a function of the information that is processed in a biological system, the brain, a system that in principle could be duplicated within a sufficiently powerful digital computer. As such, on this view it would be possible to construct a conscious, thinking mind in a purely digital medium. This possibility is the foundation for the view that our own world may in fact be a digital simulation such as the one depicted in the movie "The Matrix." The materialist/functionalist philosopher holds that it is theoretically possible, and eventually feasible, to construct a complex matrix with multiple conscious entities that is epistemologically identical with a material world. We might even be living in such a world without knowing it, perhaps an “ancestor simulation,” created by "our" technologically superior "descendants." While the information that is accessible to us suggests that we are living in a natural, physical and biological cosmos, rather then a digital information based one, there would be no way of differentiating between the two, as the physicalist/naturalistic viewpoint would be programmed into our digital matrix. The argument goes that if it is indeed possible to create such simulations, unless we believe that our descendants will be incapable of, or choose not to do so, then there is a likelihood, with a probability greater (perhaps much greater) than “0” that we are currently living in one of these digital constructions. On the assumption that there may be numerous such constructions, numerous such constructed worlds, it has even been suggested that the majority of "living worlds" are simulated, digitally constructed ones rather than natural biological ones, and that the majority of conscious entities in the universe are digital simulations. 

It is even possible, and perhaps likely that simulations could be constructed within simulations. For example, on the assumption that we ourselves are a simulation, we may soon reach a point in our own development where we are capable of channeling information in such a manner as to create a simulation ourselves. There may thus be n orders of such simulations: simulations within simulations within simulations, etc., perhaps, according to Professor Bostrum limited only by the potential for computing power within the original natural universe, which given the possibility of creating quantum computer systems of enormous dimensions, would be quite vast indeed.

The interesting thing about these “simulations within simulations,” is that they become so remote from their purported materialist foundations as to mimic the character of spiritual worlds within worlds that are spoken of in certain mystical and theosophical traditions. Indeed, it would be virtually impossible for anyone within any of these worlds within worlds to test or verify the hypothesis that there is a materialist ground to their being. While philosophers in such a simulated world might speculate that there is such a materialist ground, in the same way that philosophers in our supposedly material world speculate that there is a spiritual or ideational ground to our own world, there would be no way of proving the question one way or another. The simulated world (which, according to Bostrum, may be our own world)  becomes the mirror image of the one that we think we are living in. Instead of living in a material world and speculating about a spiritual/ideational foundation for it, we will be living in an ideational world and speculating about a material foundation for it. If one were to assume or conclude that we are indeed living in a simulation then the idea of a materialist foundation for it may drop out altogether, as, from an epistemological point of view, all we have is information.  This is another way of saying that one way of looking at our own world is that it is based upon sense data and phenomenological experience. Thus, one interesting implication of the simulation argument, however, is that the opposite assumption, that we are living in a material universe, in which mind is simply the function of material events and processes, ultimately leads to the view that we may indeed be living in a “simulated” world in which matter has no genuine immediate place, and is simply a speculative or even “empty” hypothesis  brought in to explain a purely ideational reality.

The Simulation Argument: Philosophical and Theological Implications

The Simulation Argument: Philosophical and Theological Implications

Sanford L. Drob, Ph.D.

In a paper entitled “Are You Living in a Computer Simulation?" http://www.simulation-argument.com/ , the Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, has put forth a rather startling argument, which suggests that we may not be the biological, material beings we think we are, but computer simulated minds, existing in a digital matrix:

Many works of science fiction as well as some forecasts by serious technologists and futurologists predict that enormous amounts of computing power will be available in the future. Let us suppose for a moment that these predictions are correct. One thing that later generations might do with their super-powerful computers is run detailed simulations of their forebears or of people like their forebears. Because their computers would be so powerful, they could run a great many such simulations. Suppose that these simulated people are conscious (as they would be if the simulations were sufficiently fine-grained and if a certain quite widely accepted position in the philosophy of mind is correct). Then it could be the case that the vast majority of minds like ours do not belong to the original race but rather to people simulated by the advanced descendants of an original race. It is then possible to argue that, if this were the case, we would be rational to think that we are likely among the simulated minds rather than among the original biological ones (N. Bostrom,  Philosophical Quarterly (2003) Vol. 53, No. 211, pp. 243-255).

In this brief essay, I will not address the question of whether we are indeed living in a simulated “matrix,” but will rather draw out some of the implications of the logical possibility that we are.  In short, I will treat the “simulation hypothesis” as a thought experiment, and argue that such an experiment provides us with a new and powerful method for adjudicating between contrasting views in philosophy and theology—views pertaining to the essential nature of “reality,” the place of values in the cosmos, and the nature of any “God” or “Absolute” that we posit as inhering within or creating the universe.

The gist of my argument is that any proposed philosophical or theological foundation must remain valid even if it is the case that we reside in a “simulation.” For example, the notion that matter is the foundation for our personal being would not hold true for a simulation (where our conscious existence would be grounded in information), and thus matter cannot be regarded as a fully foundational onto-psychological principle. Indeed, the doctrine of “scientific materialism” would be false for the “information bound” world of a simulation—as matter itself would simply be another piece of “information” programmed into our “simulated” reality. While, one might speculate that a simulated world must be rooted in the computer hardware existing in an actual material world—this would just be a hypothesis based upon the program that directs our simulation. Similarly, the “laws of physics” would have been programmed into our simulation and thus could not be considered fundamental laws of reality.  Indeed the “facts” of a simulation are actually more compatible with philosophical idealism than materialism.

The possibility that we are living in an information-based “simulation” as opposed to a material world provides a strong argument for the notion that values, which are often thought to be emotionally based ephemera that barely supervene upon the bedrock of a material world, are actually more "real" than matter itself. In a simulation or “matrix,” matter would have no real existence, but it would still be wrong and evil to cause needless suffering to conscious entities, and one would still be obligated to show compassion to entities that suffer. The possibility of a simulation provides ammunition for the view of Levinas that ethics precedes, and is more fundamental than, metaphysics and ontology.  It can be further argued that a whole "firmament" of values, including beauty, justice, happiness, truth, freedom, meaning, forgiveness, hope, etc. have universal  applicability to all worlds, simulated or not. Values would, on this view, be more foundational and real than matter.(We might also suggest on similar grounds that consciousness is more fundamental than matter--but this paradoxical view must await further consideration).

The possibility that we are conscious entities existing in a simulated matrix also has important theological implications. An argument against the existence of a personal creator God can be put forth on the grounds that since we have no way of knowing whether or not our particular world is or is not a simulation, (or perhaps even a second, third or "nth" order simulation in which information worlds are embedded within information worlds etc.)  we cannot determine whether our “creator” is simply a finite (albeit super-advanced) being that appears to us to have the powers of a god, but who is actually an evil or indifferent “demiurge”-- perhaps even a child who created us as part of an assignment for an unfathomably advanced future school, or a massively intelligent independent computer that produced us for its own amusement. Now, if we are in such a simulation our "creator" would have the characteristics of a creator and personal  god but would  hardly be a god in the sense required by religion, even if, and perhaps especially if, he or she were to reveal himself in miracles, or we encountered  him in heaven after our death etc. For all we know such a God would be nothing more than a “computer programmer,” no more a God than the demiurge of the Gnostics, the evil genius of Descartes, or that super-brained “kid” completing his school assignment.  We would have no good reason to venerate him, her, or it, as a God. While prayer and supplication might even be effective with such a "god," this would be nothing more than the prayer or supplication we address to an our-earthly potentate. 

My argument is that any conception of God or the Absolute that could turn out to be the result of “programming by a kid” is not a conception worthy of our theological or philosophical interest. It, again, follows that all, or nearly all, conceptions of a creator, commanding, miracle-making, heaven-residing, personal God, do not pass the test of the “simulation argument.” This is because the characteristics of   such a God could very well simply be the result of the whim or fancy of the (super-advanced) child or computer. Thus, the narratives about God, promulgated in the Bible and other scripture, with some notable exceptions (such as God's declaration to Moses, Ehyeh asher ehyeh, "I will be that which I will be") do not seem to pass muster under this test.

There have, of course, been philosophers and mystics who in their own idiom, recognized that any God characterized by “empirical traits” cannot be the deity, i.e. the One, the Good, to use the language of Plotinus, that is required by philosophy. The simulation argument is simply a way of underscoring the futility and irrationality of defining God in empirical terms. The alternative is define God or the absolute in much broader strokes that are applicable to the entire cosmos, whether simulated or not, and applicable to all simulations, and layers of simulation that may be “above” the world we reside in. Such a conception must, in effect, be binding upon and “transcend” any so-called “God” that has merely created our world. Amongst the candidates for such a transcendent God or absolute, are  "the foundation of all being," "the basis for morality and ethics," "the ground of reason," or, as I have argued elsewhere, "the infinite open-economy of inquiry, thought, feeling and experience." This is closer to  the God of mystics and of philosophers who have had the vision to think beyond the limitations of our parochial "reality." This is the Plotinian “One” and “Good,” the Hindu’s Brahman-Atman, and the Kabbalist’s Ein-sof.

Now the idea that we are living in a simulation, rests on a number of unproven assumptions, not the least of which are the very possibility of creating conscious minds in a digital matrix and the existence of a super-advanced civilization interested in creating them, and one may well think that anyone who suggests it as a real (as opposed to logical) possibility is suffering from  the Capgras Syndrome, the delusion that others have been replaced by identical, often mechanical or "zombie" duplicates of themselves.  However, the idea that we may be living in a simulation certainly appears to help clarify some very important philosophical and theological questions.

Your comments are welcome.